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FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS--COLLATERAL ATTACK
WAX FRUIT': THE COGNIZABILITY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS-
IN COLLATERAL ATTACKS UPON CONVICTIONS
In Kaufman v. United States' the Supreme Court
held that a federal prisoner could collaterally chal-
lenge the validity of a conviction predicated on the
admission of illegally seized evidence, notwith-
standing his failure to raise the Fourth Amendment
issue on direct appeal.
Harold Kaufman was indicted for armed robbery
of a federally insured savings and loan association.3
At trial defense counsel conceded that Kaufman
committed the act and pleaded him insane. Counsel
9bjected to the admission of certain evidence that
tended to establish the defendant's sanity on the
ground that it was inadmissible as the fruit of an
illegal search, but the court overruled the objec-
tion. Kaufman's appeal was prosecuted by a newly
appointed counsel who did not raise the search and
seizure issue.4 The conviction was affirmed,5 and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
While serving sentence Kaufman filed a motion
for post conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section
2255,7 claiming that his conviction *as based upon
1 "Plays can close. Television you can turn off.
Wax fruit lays in the bowl till you're a haundred".
N. Siuox, Coss Brow Youa HoN 80-81 (1963).
2394 U.S. 217 (1969).
3 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) (d) (1964).
4 Although newly appointed counsel did not assign
the admission of allegedly illegal evidence as error,
Kaufman wrote a letter requesting him to submit.a
fourth amendment claim to the court of appeals. Coun-
sel forwarded the letter to the court, but the subsequent
opinion affirming the conviction did not appear to pass
on the search and seizure claim. See Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 n.3 (1969).
r Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408 (8th
Cir. 1965).
6 383 U.S. 951 (1966).
'The pertinent provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1964) are:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
* established by Act of Congress claiming the right to
be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or that the court was withoutjurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any
time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled tt no relief, the court shall cause notice
thereof to be served upon the United States at-
torney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make fiudings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the
court finds that the... sentence imposed was not
the admission of illegally seized evidence. The
federal district court denied relief, holding that the
record did not substantiate the claim of illegal
search and seizure8 and further asserting that the
issue, not being assigned as error on direct appeal,
was not a ground for collateral attack through a
Section 2255 motion.9 The district court and the
court of appeals then denied Kaufman's applica-
tion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.'0 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari," and treated
these actions by the lower courts as denying that
claims of unlawful search and seizure could be
raised on a motion to vacate under Section 2255.2
This denial was in accord with overwhelming
precedent throughout the federal judicial system.'3
authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral
attack, or that there has been such a denial or
infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the
judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or
resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such
motion without requiring the production of the
prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to
entertain a second or successive motion for similar
relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
8 Kaufman v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 484
(E.D. Mo. 1967).
9 Id. at 487.
10 In foria pauperis is the manner in which an in-
digent defendant perfects an appeal without liability
for costs. The denials to Kaufman were not accompanied
by written opinions.
U390 U.S. 1002 (1968).
1Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 219-20
(1969).
" United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1967);
De Welles v. United States, 372 F.2d 67 (7th Cir.
1967); Cox v. United States, 351 F.2d 280 (8th Cir.
1965); Eisner v. United States, 351 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.
1965); Kapsalis v. United States, 345 F.2d 392 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1965); Nash v. United
States, 342 F.2d 366 5th Cir. (1965); Springer v. United
States, 340 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1965); Armstead v.
United States, 318 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1963); Thompson
v. United States, 315 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 843 (1963); Peters v. United States, 312
F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1963); Warren v. United States,
311 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1963); Williams v. United
States, 307 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1960); United States
v. DeFillo, 182 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affid
per curiam, 277 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960); Eberhart v.
United States, 262 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1958); Plummer
v. United States, 260 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Wil-
kens v. United States, 258 F.2d 416, (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 942 (1958); White v. United States.
235 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
In several cases, however, the courts have indi-
cated a substantial degree of uncertainty as to the
propriety of this rule by denying the motion on the
merits and suggesting dismissal of the claim as non-
cognizable under Section 2255 or on alternate
grounds.14 This uncertainty is, perhaps, under-
standable since the federal courts regularly enter-
tain the motion when it is based on other constitu-
tional grounds.'5 Several lower federal courts have
indicated, in dicta, that Fourth Amendment claims
should also be recognized under Section 2255.16
14 See, e.g., Sims v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 577
(D.C. Md. 1966), aff'd, 382 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1967); United States v.
Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 671 (2d Cir. 1952).
1 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)
(sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963);
Thomas v. United States, 352 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (fifth amendment protection against self-incrim-
ination). Section 2255, the mechanism by which a
federal prisoner may apply for collateral relief, is
simply one species of the genus labeled habeas corpus.
However, the term habeas corpus is more commonly
affiliated with the state prisoner's request for collateral
relief in a federal court which is governed by 28 U.S.C.
2254. Because the substantive extent of Section 2255 is
defined by the scope of rights cognizable under a writ
of habeas corpus to state prisoners, effect is given to
2255 claims having 2254 precedents. Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 n.5 (1962); Larson v. United
States, 275 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1960). Examples of
claims cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus to
state prisoners include: Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254
U.S. 71 (1920) (fifth amendment); Morgan v. DeVine,
237 U.S. 632 (1915) (double jeopardy); Rogers v.
Peck, 199 U.S. 425 (1905) (due process clause of four-
teenth amendment); Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24
(1898) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) (fifth amendment grandjury right).
16 The Tenth Circuit in Gaitan v. United States,
317 F.2d 494, 496 (10th Cir. 1963), said that the issue
of the admissibility of illegally seized evidence had a
constitutional basis and was therefore available under
section 2255. The rationale for this conclusion was
gleaned from Justice Black's concurring opinion in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961):
[Wihen the Fourth Amendment's ban against un-
reasonable searches and seizures is considered
together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against
compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional
basis emerges which not only justifies but actually
requires the exclusionary rule.
In United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221, 222-23
(4th Cir. 1963), the Fourth Circuit indicated that the
improper seizure of evidence in violation of the fourth
amendment was a constitutional question which could
be raised in an application for vacation or correction of
a single sentence. The Court was concerned with the
magnitude of the error committed and based its con-
clusion on Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962) which distinguishes between constitutional andjurisdictional errors on the one hand and ordinary
trial errors on the other. See note 20 infra. For support
of the section 2255 cognizance on fourth amendment
grounds in the district courts, see United States v.
Winstead, 226 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
Section 2255 was designed to revise federal
habeas corpus relief by providing that the federal
prisoner seek post conviction relief in the original
sentencing court rather than in the court in the
district of his confinement. 7 This change was de-
signed to minimize the administrative difficulties
encountered in a habeas corpus proceeding' s but
was not intended to narrow the scope of grounds
for a collateral attack upon a conviction. 9 Thus,
although the court in which to bring a 2255 applica-
tion was changed, there was no modification of the
rule that only error of the magnitude cognizable
under a writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners
formed an appropriate ground for relief. 0
The basic uncertainty as to whether 2255 relief
extended to alleged Fourth Amendment violations
was accentuated by the fact that the courts of ap-
peal have denied cognizance without enumerating
reasons for distinguishing search and seizure claims
for collateral relief from other constitutional
grounds where relief was granted." In Thornton v.
United States," however, the District of Columbia
Circuit, in holding that 2255 should not be avail-
'7 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219(1952).18 Among the serious practical difficulties that had
arisen in administering habeas corpus procedure to
federal prisoners was the requirement that the action
be brought in the court of the district of confinement.
The few district courts whose territorial jurisdiction
included the major federal penal institutions were
required to handle an inordinate number of habeas
corpus actions. During the six years preceeding enact-
ment of section 2255 in 1948, 63% of all habeas corpus
applications were filed in but 5 of the 84 district courts.
See Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10
OmO ST. L.J. 337 (1949). The district courts encoun-
tered numerous other hurdles in attempting to decide
collateral claims away from the scene of the factual
situation, the homes of witnesses, and the records of
the sentencing court. Because the trial records were
not always available, the court in the district of con-
finement was often forced to consider repetitious or
frivolous applications for collateral relief. Thus, in
order to obviate the impediments inherent in habeas
corpus procedure regarding federal prisoners, section
2255 was inserted into the 1948 Revision of the Judicial
Code. See S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10(1948).
19United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219
(1952); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962).
20 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). A
section 2255 request on the ground that the defendant
was not given the opportunity to make a post con-
viction statement was disallowed because of the in-
significance of the error. The Court further stated that
an error which serves as an adequate ground for habeas
corpus relief is a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omis-
sion inconsistent with the basic demands of fair pro-
cedure. Id. at 428.
" See cases cited note 13 supra.
"368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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able on Fourth Amendment grounds, suggested
various reasons supporting its contention. The
Court asserted that pragmatic notions of finality in
criminal litigation dictated that collateral relief be
treated differently with regard to federal prisoners
than with regard to state prisoners,n and that the
vitality of the Fourth Amendment' was ade-
quately served by the opportunity afforded a
federal defendant to enforce the exclusionary rule
at or before trial.2 ' The Court concluded that a
2255 motion for collateral rblief based on an uncon-
stitutional search and seizure should be available
only on a showing of exceptional circumstances 26
The government's argument in Kaufman was
structured on the Thornton reasoning and the
decision in Sunal v. Large,2n which prevented cer-
tain constitutional claims from cognizance under
2255 because the writ of habeas corpus was de-
signed for collateral review on a judgment of con-
viction and not as a substitute for appeal for
alleged errors committed at-trial.I
In Kaufman, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking
for the majority of a divided court,"° rejected the
argument that 2255 relief was not -vailable as a
substitute for an appeal by distinguishing the
limitations posed in Sunac on the ground that they
were discussed in the context of an alleged noncon-
stitutional trial error, and not error of the magni-
tude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus."
Brennan then noted that Townsend v. Sai, 2 had
2Id. at 828-29.
24 The vigor of fourth amendment protection would
not be strengthened by the relatively minimal addi-
tional deterence afforded by collateral remedy. For
the refutation of this argument see note 72 infra and
accompanying text.
5Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 828
(D.C. Cir. 1966).261 Id. at 829. A situation exemplifying "exceptional
circumstances" exists where the law was changed after
the time for an appeal had expired, cf. Warring v.
Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
678 (1941), as opposed to a situation in which the
appeal was not perfected because the definitive ruling
on the question of law had not been crystallized. Sunal
v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). Exceptional circum-
stances are also present where a denial of constitutional
rights persists through lack of counsel, Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), through perjury sub-
sequentily discovered, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935), or through mob determination, Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). See generally Smith v.
United States, 187 F.2d 192, -(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951).
2See text accompanying notes 23 and 25 supra.
"332 U.S. 174 (1947).
9 Id. at 178.
8D The division of the Court was 5-3 with Mr. Justice
Marshall not taking part. . "
31394 U.S. at 223. See note 20 supra.
32 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
held that habeas corpus was not to be denied state
prisoners alleging constitutional deprivations solely
* because they failed to seek remedy by appeal" By
stating that the power of inquiry on federal
habeas corpus is plenary," the Townsend Court
apparently cloaked the federal judiciary with
jurisdictional authority to consider issues of consti-
tutional magnitude on collateral appeal.35 How-
ever, because Townsend involved the habeas corpus
request of a state prisoner, Brennan found it neces-
sary to review the historical development of the
habeas corpus remedy in regard to state prisoners
as a basis for extending collateral relief to federal
prisoners.2 '
The renowned trilogy of cases that liberalized the
post conviction doctrine of habeas corpus to imple-
ment justice more expeditiously"7 with regard to
state prisoners included Townsend, Fay v. Noia,s
and Henry v. Mississippi." In Townsend the Court
attempted to redefine and outline the guidelines as
to when a petitioner convicted in a state court is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal
district court. The petitioner is entitled to review if:
1. The merits of the factual dispute were
not resolved in the state hearing, or
2. The state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole, or
3. The fact-finding procedure employed by
the state was not adequate to afford a full and
fair hearing, or
4. There is a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence, or
5. The material facts were not adequately
developed in the state court hearing, or
6. For any reason it appears that the state
trier of fact did not afford the applicant a full
and fair fact hearing."
Noia allowed federal collateral review of an un-
Id. at 311-12.
34 Id. at 312.
3" See Brennan, Judicial Supervision of Criminal
Law Administration, 9 CRnm AxD DELwQ. 222, 231
(1963).
36 Although the scope of relief under 2255 is defined
by the rights granted to a state prisoner under habeas
corpus proceedings, see note 15 supra, the courts con-
tinually choose to distinguish the two avenues for
collateral relief. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that
the federal prisoner applying for post conviction relief
has had access to the federal courts while the state
prisoner has not. See notes 46-48 infra and accom-
panying text.
But cf. Habeas Corpus-Waiver of Constitutional
Guarantees, 45 N.C.L. R.v. 1056 (1967).
38 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
39 379 U.S. 443 (1965).40 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 318 (1963).
19701
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appealed state conviction by ruling that an allega-
tion of unconstitutionality is not defeated by any-
thing that may occur in state court proceedings 4
Thus, a failure to appeal the original conviction
would not bar collateral attack if the appeal were
not available at the time collateral relief is re-
quested. Although this situation would normally
arise under exceptional circumstances,4' a court,
under the Noia doctrine, could grant relief in the
interest of justice even though a prisoner know-
ingly failed to appeal.4' Henry expanded this notion
by holding that even a legitimate state interest
being served by a procedural requirement neither
substantiates the constitutionality of state proce-
dure which threatens to override a federal right nor
bars a challenge to the requirement on collateral
attack.M Thus, collateral relief, as presently inter-
preted regarding state prisoners, permits a legiti-
mate, viable constitutional claim which is not
raised at trial or on appeal to be vindicated
through the habeas corpus remedy.45
The government, in Kaufman, conceded the
existence of substantial justifications for federal
district court relitigation of federal contentions
arising in a state criminal prosecution.46 Its argu-
ment, however, emphasized that, unlike the state
prisoner, the federal prisoner was tried in a federal
forum from the beginning. Since he had the oppor-
tunity to litigate his constitutional claim before a
federal judge and to appeal to a federal court of
appeals, the federal judicial system has already had
41 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963).
42 See note 26 supra.
43 Gladden v. Gidley, 337 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1964).
4"Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965).
45 T right to the habeas remedy is usually made
conditional on the fact that the constitutional violation
was not admitted due to the inexcusable neglect of the
defendant in failing to object to an obvious constitu-
tional infirmity. However, inexcusable neglect is
reduced to virtual insignificance because a sixth amend-
ment ineffective assistance of counsel issue may be
proffered when an obvious constitutional violation goes
unnoticed by counsel. Also, where knowledge of con-
stitutional infirmities is clouded by abstruse state
procedures, the defendant cannot be charged with
inexcusable neglect. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443 (1965).
46 justifications for affording a federal forum to a
state prisoner include the necessity that federal courts
have the "last say" with respect to questions of federal
law, the inadequacy of state procedures to raise and
preserve federal claims, and the concern that statejudges may be unsympathetic to federally created
rights. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction
Remedy For State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. R.v. 461
(1960). But see Bator, Finality In Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 441 (1963); justice Harlan's dissent in Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963).
the "last say" and no reason exists to allow col-
lateral relitigation.0 Thus, the government con-
tended that Kaufman should not be entitled to
post conviction relief because considerations of
finality militate against the continued existence of
federal collateral remedy.4
Justice Brennan negated this argument by as-
serting that the effective protection of constitu-
tional rights in criminal trials necessitates a con-
tinuing access to a mechanism for collateral relief.49
"The right then is not merely to a federal forum
but to a full and fair consideration of constitu-
tional claims." 50 This position is perfectly legiti-
mate despite the fact that it may increase the
administrative burden on the federal courts. There
is no assurance that the federal trial and appeal
process is infallible or that new circumstances may
not arise to invalidate the prior litigation." No
conviction should be finalized until the defendant
has received a legitimate adjudication of every
valid constitutional claim asserted.
Kaufman extended the rulings applicable to state
prisoners with collateral search and seizure claims"
17 Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 829
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
S4 Considerations' of finality involve duplication ofjudicial effort, delay in setting the criminal proceeding
at rest, inconvenience and possible danger in trans-
porting a prisoner to the sentencing court for hearing,
and loss of reliability in determination of the merits
due to postponed litigation. See Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255, 112 U. PA. L. RPv. 378,
383-84 (1964).
49 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226
(1969).
50 Id. at 228. In support of this conclusion Brennan
cited Judge Wright's dissent in Thornton v. United
States, 368 F.2d 822, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1966), which
perceptively characterizes the relationship between
the present interpretation of habeas corpus proceedings
regarding state prisoners and the application of 2255
relief to federal prisoners by saying, "The question is
not whether relitigation is necessary, but whether one
adequate litigation has been afforded."
1 Issac v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1096 (D.S.C.
1968), held collateral relief under 2255 to be available
where a conviction was made under a subsequently
invalidated statute with retroactive application.
Petitioner, who had been convicted of possessing a
firearm which had not been registered under the
National Firearms Act, was entitled to have his con-
viction and sentence vacated when the Supreme Court,
in United States v. Haynes, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), found
the specific section of the act under which petitioner
was convicted to be violative of the privilege against
self-incrimination. Since 2255 relief is available to
correct constitutional errors retroactively applicable,
it should also be available to correct constitutional
errors subsequently discovered for both situations
disclose unconstitutionality realized subsequent to
conviction;
2Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Corafas
v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden,
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to federal prisoners by holding that, despite notions
of finality, federal prisoners are no less entitled to
such consideration and that there is no reason to
give greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults
by federal defendants than to similar defaults of
state defendants.
To supplement his conclusion Brennan placed
particular reliance on Sanders v. United States"
where the Court reversed the denial of a second
2255 application after the first had been denied
without a hearing. 5  Spehking for the Sanders
majority, Brennan concluded that controlling
weight may not be given to a denial of a prior ap-
plication if it was not adjudicated on the merits or
if a different issue was presented by the new ap-
plication. 5 If a 2255 motion is granted where a new
ground is presented through a repeat application,
relief should certainly be granted on a constitu-
tional ground initially presented subsequent to trial
and appeal. In order to guarantee the full measure
of constitutional protection to a federal defendant
collateral relief should be available whenever a
constitutional claim may arise.
The final contention promulgated by the govern-
ment proposed that Kaufman's claim that evidence
admitted at his trial was the fruit of an illegal
search was not a proper ground for collateral attack
because of the remote relationship between col-
lateral proceedings and the deterrent function of
the exclusionary rule. Brennan did not explicitly
refute this contention, but rather stated that it had
been rejected with regard to state prisoners7 and,
because federal prisoners were now being given
387 U.S. 294 (1967). Although these cases do not discuss
the cognizability of search and seizure claims in a
habeas corpus proceeding, the substantive effect of
the decisions is to grant habeas relief on fourth amend-
ment grounds.
0394 U.S. at 228-31 (1969). Brennan rejected
Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir.
1966), and adopted Judge Wright's dissent which
lends conclusive support to the Kaufman holding:
It would be anomalous indeed, especially in light of
the interest in maintaining good federal-state
relations, if defaults not precluding one adequate
federal review for the constitutional claims of
state prisoners precluded such a review for federal
prisoners, or if defects rendering state court ad-
judications inadequate did not similarly affect
federal court adjudications.
Id. at 3.
"373 U.S. 1 (1963).
55 Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
1961)..
56 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1963).
57 The availability of collateral remedy works to
insure the integrity of criminal proc.eedings at and
before trial where constitutional" rights are at stake.
See generally cases cited note 52 supra.
equal consideration," the claim should be rejected
regarding federal prisoners as well.
The Court concluded that:
Conventional notions of finality in criminal
litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the
manifest federal policy that federal constitu-
tional rights shall not be denied without the
fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial
review. 59
Justice Black's dissent 0 admitted that collateral
attack is justifiable where the constitutional integ-
rity of the fact finding process had been violated,
but demanded that the convicted defendant raise
the type of constitutional claim that casts some
degree of doubt on his guilt." Black noted that the
historic role of the doctrine of habeas corpus was
to insure against flaws in the guilt determining
process. 62
On the factual circumstances applicable to the
Kaufman litigation, Black's analysis traverses the
issue. Harold Kaufman's original plea was not
guilty by reason of insanity;O the illegally seized
evidence related to the determination of his mental
condition." Whether or not the accused actually
committed the crime lapses into the realm of the
irrelevant upon a plea of insanity. The focus. of
analysis should not center on the prisoner's guilt,
but on whether the admission of illegally seized
evidence prevented the defendant from establish-
ing mental incompetence. Thus, because the ques-
tion of guilt is devoid of practical significance when
the defendant pleads insanity, Justice Black's
dissent is relevant only to the extent that it relates
" See note 53 supra and accompaiiying text.59 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228
(1968); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963);
Fay v. Noa, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
60 394 U.S. at 235. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice
Stewart, also submitted a written dissent concurring
to a great extent with Justice Black but disassociating
himself from any implications that the availability
of collateral relief turned on the petitioner's assertion
of his innocence. See text accompanying notes 73-75
infra.
6*Defense counsel conceded that Kaufman com-
mitted the robbery. 394 U.S. at 231. Justice Black
would apparently grant collateral relief only in situa-
tions where the prisoner's innocence was obvious
without regard to the repercussions of a conviction
laden with constitutional infirmities.
2394 U.S. at 234. See Mishkin, The Supreme Court,
1964 Term-Forward: The High Court The Great Writ,
And the Due Process of Time And Law, 79 HAv. L. R:v.
56, 79-486 (1965).
6Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408, 409
(8th Cir. 1965).




to the majority's decision in terms of the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. 5 If, contrary to
Black, collateral proceedings have any realistic
deterrent effect on unconstitutional police activity,
Kaufman should be given the opportunity of estab-
lishing his insanity without having to meet the
challenge of illegally seized evidence.
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is
to compel respect for the Fourth Amendment
guaranty of freedom against unlawful search by
removing the incentive to violate constitutional
rights. 6 Regarding the degree to which the exclu-
sionary rule should be applied, the Kaufman issue
may be presented as the confrontation between the
deterrent effect that the expansion of collateral
proceedings may have regarding official illegality
in the form of Fourth Amendment violation and
the public interest in convicting a defendant who,
by his own admission, is guilty.Y Justice Black
agreed with the decision in Thornton v. United
States' which indicated that collateral attack
would be of little weight in achieving the pattern of
lawful conduct by enforcement officials that is the
object of the exclusionary rule.69 The Thornton
Court felt that the fountainhead of maximum con-
stitutional protection regarding illegal search and
seizure had been crystallized in Section 41(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure0 and that
the need for enlarging collateral review in order to
assure effective vindication of the constitutional
interests involved was minimalU'
This conclusion is antithetical to the doctrinal
belief that the process of American criminal litiga-
tion must secure the constitutional integrity of the
proceedings from arrest through incarceration. A
semantic argument assuming that the enlargement
of collateral remedies will not affect adherence to
Fourth Amendment principles is based on a
6" Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237-40
(1969) (dissenting opinion).
66 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
67 See note 61 supra.
368 F.2d 822, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1966).69 See, Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 389-90. Addi-
tional deterrence has passed the point of diminishing
returns and afflicts disproportionate harm on the
public interest in the confinement and rehabilitation
of wrongdoers.
70 18 U.S.C. § 3114 (1964):
The motion [to suppress illegally seized evidence]
shall be made before trial or hearing unless op-
portunity therefore did not exist or the defendant
was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but
the court in its discretion may entertain the motion
at a trial or hearing.71Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 826
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
questionable presumption. Unless evidence can be
gathered to empirically demonstrate that expanded
collateral relief has absolutely no deterrent func-
tion, paramount constitutional considerations
dictate the presumption that it does serve a deter-
rent purpose 2 Whether the need for securing con-
stitutional adherence is perceived to be maximal or
minimal, an avenue for admonishing constitutional
integrity must always remain open.
While justice Black's dissent concerned itself
with cutting back the scope of the exclusionary
rule, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart,
submitted a dissent disparaging the Court's refusal
to reduce the scope of collateral remedy." Harlan
thought it unfortunate that the court used Kauf-
man to increase the availability of collateral
remedy and contended that such availability
should be narrowed. Harlan also dissented in
Fay v. Noa 74 where he stated that no matter what
the circumstances, one wrongly convicted must
pursue his vindication through the uncertain
mechanism of executive clemency."5
Although Harlan's position is harsh, the policy
underpinnings of his position coincide with the
aforementioned considerations of finality 6 The
administrative difficulties created by allowing post
conviction, post appeal collateral attack on a
previously uncontested constitutional point" can
7 The public interest in repressing crime was long
ago found to be subservient to the social need that the
law "shall not be flouted by the insolence of the office."
The quoted language is that of Justice Cardozo, then
Judge Cardozo, in People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13,
23, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926). The paramount social
need demanding that every citizen have the type of
protection designed to secure the common interest
against the unlawful invasion of his property was the
basis for the adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Whether the
exclusionary rule is regarded as a judicial sanction or
as a constitutional requirement, its magnitude is
imbedded at the heart of American constitutional
criminal law. Compare United States v. Wallace and
Tieman Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949) with Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). Although in a par-
ticular case insistence upon such rules may appear
as a technicality that benefits a guilty person, the
history of the criminal law provides that tolerance of
expediency in law enforcement impairs its enduring
effectiveness. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,
313 (1958).
7394 U.S. at 242-43.74372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
7 Id. at 476.
76 See note 48 supra.
7While the problems of stale evidence and other
aspects of finality are not peculiar to fourth amend-
ment grounds fpr collateral relief, the analysis here
will be couched in "search and seizure" language simply
because the Kaufman litigation revolves around that
issue. Where fourth amendment grounds may differ
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best be analyzed by striking an analogy between
fresh fruit and wax fruit.
The principle of declaring evidence inadmissible
because it was procured as a result of an illegal
search and seizure has been referred to as the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrineYs Where the fruit of
the poisonous tree is contested in compliance with
Section 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 9 the problem of stale evidence is minimal
because the fruit is still fresh-the litigation is
proceeding, memories are vivid, and witnesses are
available. However, if the claim of illegal search
and seizure were entertained on collateral attack,
not only might the entire trial be discarded, but,
taking into account the possible unavailability of
witnesses present at the original trial and lapses of
memory, the fruit will have spoiled and stale evi-
dence would become a distinct problem80
Whereas fresh fruit will spoil, wax fruit will not.,
Thus, if the fruit of an illegal search was considered
to possess the longevity of wax fruit, the anti-col-
lateral remedy analysis leads to the belief that the
public interest in securing a Just conviction would
be prejudiced by the attenuated degree of finality
in criminal litigation. The comparison betvieen
fresh fruit and wax fruit is demonstrative of the
fact that it is not the physical evidence itself, but
the manner in which it is obtained that should be
the concern of the judiciary. Whether fruit is
manifested as fresh fruit or wax fruit, it is still
cognizable as fruit; whether. constitutionally
violative evidence is contested prior to trial or sub-
sequent to conviction, it is still unconstitutionally
seized evidence which, despite notions of finality,
should not be admitted against a defendant. 2
Since 2255 relief is now available to vindicate
Fourth Amendment violations, it is conceivable
that tactical delays in presenting search and
seizure claims could permit guilt to go unpunished.
An attorney could refrain from objecting to the
from collateral claims based on other amendments is
in the repercussions of their refusal. If a collateral
claim is defeated on the basis of another amendment,
only one person will be affected-the person who re-
mains in jail because of the disallowance of his claim;
if a Fourth Amendment request for collateral relief is
rejected, society as a whole suffers because of the
diminished efficacy of the exclusionary rule.
78 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643'(1961); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).7 9 Note 70 supra.
BOThornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 827
(D.C. Cir. 1966). It will be remembered that Thwrntan
was rejected. See note 53 supra.
81 See note I supra.
82 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
admission of illegally seized evidence, avoid the
issue on appeal, and request collateral relief under
2255 after a sufficient length of time had passed.
Even assuming that Kaufman can be read so as to
make irrelevant a deliberate bypassing of an objec-
tion at trial, the drawback to this is that a possibly
successful suppression of evidence would be fore-
gone and the convicted defendant would remain
incarcerated until strategy dictated the tender of a
2255 claim. In any event, it is necessary to establish
guidelines under which a 2255 request which, has
satisfied the criteria requisite to collateral relief
can be rejected.
Sanders v. United Statesn enumerated basic
standards governing situations in which a repeat
application for 2255 relief can be denied. Collateral
relief should be denied (1) where the ground for
relief has been determined adversely to the appli-
cant on a prior application and he cannot show that
the ends of justice would be served by a redeter-
mination, or (2) where the government can show
that the applicant has abused the remedy u
These rules should likewise be applicable to
federal prisoners requesting collateral relief on a
previously uncontested constitutional issue."
While the force of these rules would return the
issue to the hands of the trial judge, 8 the applicant
for collateral relief would not be summarily dis-
missed simply because the nature of request was
based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
While a knowing waiver of constitutional rightsn
and inexcusable neglect to proffer an objection to
the admission of illegally seized evidencen would
constitute abuses of the remedy, other standards of
aluse would have to be developed on a pragmatic,
case by case basis through the discretion of the
trial judge. The burden to show that the ends of
justice would be served by a redetermination of
his conviction should be on the applicant, but he
must be given the opportunity to meet this burden.
Before the aura of finality encompasses his convic-
-373 U.S. 1 (1963).841 Id. at 15-19.85Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 833
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).86 One member of the federal judiciary feels that a
greater reliance on the discretion of the trial judge
would alleviate many of the problems in habeas corpus
proceedings. See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus,.8 F.R.D. 171 (1949).
87 Knowing waiver is an intentional relinquishment
of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
83 See note 45 supra.
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tion, a federal defendant should be given a com-
plete adjudication on every constitutional claim
asserted9 9 It is hoped that frivolous claims will be
denied as abuses of the 2255 remedy while meritori-
ous claims will be vindicated. The availability of
collateral remedy is necessary to insure the integ-
rity of a conviction where constitutional rights
are at stake. 9
Although Kaufman's attorney objected to the
admission of the seized evidence at trial, and
Kaufman himself sought to renew the objection on
89 One commentator has noted different degrees of
finality depending upon the time at which the search
and seizure claim is raised. See Amsterdam, supra
note 48, at 386-88. He notes four different situations
as to the time of collaterally proffering a fourth amend-
ment claim: (a) following a plea of guilty, see, e.g.,
White v. Peppersack, 352 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1965);
Sullivan v. United States, 315 F.2d 304 (10th Cir.
1963); Simms v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 577 (D.C.
Md. 1966); (b) following trial and appeal where the
issue was not raised, see, e.g., Cox v. United States, 351
F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1965); Peters v. United States, 312
F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1963); White v. United States, 235
F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v. Walker,
197 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1952); (c) following trial at which
the issue was raised and decided adversely to the
accused, and the accused (i) failed to perfect an appeal,
see, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (4th
Cir. 1963); Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d 366(9th Cir. 1962), or (ii) did not raise the issue on appeal,
see, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969);
Nash v. United States, 342 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1965);
Sinks v. United States, 318 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1963);(d) following trial and appeal where the issue was
raised and decided adversely to the accused, see, e.g.,
Eisner v. United States, 351 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1965).
A fifth category that should be added to those rec-
ognized by Professor Amsterdam is a request for col-
lateral review following a trial at which the issue was
not raised and an appeal where it was raised under
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides that "[D]efects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought
to the attention of the court." See, e.g., Gendron v.
United States, 340 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1965); United
States v. DeFillo, 182 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
aJ'd per curiam 277 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960). Although
there may be some difference with regard to finality
in these situations, the courts should not make these
distinctions in reaching their decisions. The sweeping
language in Kaufman is authority for granting collateral
relief on a fourth amendment ground regardless of when
it was raised. See text accompanying notes 96 and 98
infra.90 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. 174, 187 (1947), said, "[Tihe writ is necessary
to prevent a complete miscarriage of justice." Frank-
furter supported Judge Learned Hand's analysis of what
was to be regarded as a miscarriage of justice. See
United States ex rel Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811(2d Cir. 1946); Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 155 (2d Cir.
1922) (dissenting opinion). Justice Douglas' dissent in
Hodges v. United States, 368 U.S. 139 (1961), indicated
that any error of constitutional magnitude not allevi-
ated through collateral relief would result in a miscar-
riage of justice.
appeal, the Supreme Court's decision in Kaufman
appears to entitle a federal prisoner to vindication
of the Fourth Amendment defects of his trial
through 2255 collateral relief even though the claim
is raised subsequent to trial and appeal. The
ramifications of this decision have significant po-
tential in liberalizing the rules controlling the
grounds upon which 2255 relief may be granted.
Heretofore the 2255 remedy has been summarily
denied in numerous situations involving constitu-
tional claims.91 This is perhaps due to lack of
certainty surrounding the available bases for col-
lateral relief. However, an attempt to confine the
right to collateral relief, whether in 2255 or habeas
corpus proceedings, into special, all inclusive cate-
gories could lead to a denial of relief where it would
proper. 92 Thus, because of the unsystematized
nature of the law regarding collateral relief, a
rational determination of the proper grounds on
which to perfect a collateral appeal is extremely
difficult.9 8 Kaufman alleviated this difficulty to a
great extent.
Alternative patterns of reasoning were available
to the Kaufman Court which would not have
significantly affected the state of law regarding
collateral relief. Firstly, the Court could have fit
Kaufman into the "exceptional circumstances"
91 See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 235 F.2d 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) (defective indictment); Bishop v. United
States, 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (defendant was
insane at the time the crime was committed); Adams v.
United States, 222 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (prosecu-
tion employed intemperate language in argument tojury); United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666 (2d
Cir. 1952) (prejudicial publicity preceeded or sur-
rounded trial); Smith v. United States, 187 F.2d 192
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951) (con-
fession admitted at trial was obtained as a result of
illegal detention); Hastings v. United States, 184 F.2d
939 (9th Cir. 1950) (erroneous instructions to jury);
Taylor v. United States, 177 F.2d 194 (4th Cir. 1949)(evidence was insufficient to justify a conviction); and
cases cited in United States v. Edwards, 152 F. Supp.
179 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd. 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958).
9 See Justice Rutledge's dissent in Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. 174, 188-89 (1946).
13 Cf. The Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal
Courts, 35 Coauss. L. REv. 404, 412 (1935):
In the absence of statutory or precedential indicia
availability of habeas corpus can rationally be deter-
mined in terms of the relative values, as applied to
the specific defect, of the finality of judicial deter-
mination, and flexibility in reexamination of errors
in the interests of human liberty.
While purely theoretical tests may be created to deter-
mine the grounds upon which collateral relief may be
granted, they are of little practical significance to a
federal prisoner requesting 2255 relief on a ground not
previously considered in collateral proceedings.
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doctrine of the Thornton decision and granted 2255
relief on that basis. Because appellate counsel did
not preserve trial counsel's challenge to the admis
sion of illegally seized evidence despite his client,
express wishes,94 the Court could have conceivably
ruled that 2255 relief was available because excep-
tional circumstances prohibited the court of
appeals from passing on the search and seizure
claim. Thus, since 2255 relief was always available
under exceptional circumstances, 5 Kaufman would
be restricted to granting collateral relief on Fourth
Amendment grounds only upon a showing of ex-
ceptional circumstances causing the failure to raise
the issue at trial or on appeal. However, the Court
chose to reject Thornton98 and thereby indicated
that collateral relief would be available anytime
a Fourth Amendment claim was requested regard-
less of the ability to demonstrate the existence of
exceptional circumstances.
Secondly, if the Kaufman. Court had simply
alluded to the habeas corpus decisions regarding
state prisoners with Fourth Amendment claimsw
and extended 2255 relief on that basis, the decision
would have had restricted import. The doctrine
denying 2255 relief on search and seizure grounds
would be overturned, but no added significance
could be gleaned from the opinion. The Court, how-
91 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
91 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
96 Note 53 supra.
97 Note 52 sura-
ever, chose to discuss the Fourth Amendment
question in unrestricted language:
The provision of federal collateral remedies
rests more fundamentally upon a recognition
that adequate protection of constitutional
rights relating to the criminal trial process
requires the continuing availability of a
mechanism for relief. s
The language of the Court indicates that Kaufman
is cogent authority for granting 2255 relief on any
constitutional ground.
By rejecting the two available approaches, the
Kaufman Court is in effect intimating that all con-
stitutional claims are cognizable under Section 2255
whenever they may be brought if the applicant
can demonstrate that he is not abusing the remedy.
This result creates a flexible categorization of the
grounds available for collateral relief so that every
person indicated for a crime will be entitled to a
full and fair adjudication of every valid constitu-
tional impediment asserted regardless of proecdural
defaults. It is herein submitted that the constitu-
tional preservation of individual rights and the
assurance against their deprivation are paramount
to considerations of administrative time pressure
and, therefore, a mechanism for collateral relief
should be available to insure the constitutional
integrity of criminal litigation.
9 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226(1969) (emphasis added); see also, Id. at 229; "Thus,
collateral relief... contributes to the present vitality of
all constitutional rights .... ." (emphasis added).
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